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Abstract—Dynamic spectrum access allows the unlicensed
wireless users (secondary users) to dynamically access the licensed
bands from legacy spectrum holders (primary users) either
on an opportunistic or a cooperative basis. In this paper, we
focus on cooperative spectrum sharing in a wireless network
consisting of multiple primary and multiple secondary users. In
particular, we study the partner-selection and resource-allocation
problems within a matching theory framework, in which the
primary and secondary users aim at optimizing their utilities in
terms of transmission rate and power consumption. We propose
a distributed algorithm to find the solution of the developed
matching game that results in a stable matching between the
sets of the primary and secondary users. Both analytical and
numerical results show that the proposed matching model is a
promising approach under which the utility functions of both
primary and secondary users are maximized.
Keywords– Cognitive radio networks, Dynamic spectrum shar-
ing, Cooperative transmission, Stackelberg game, Stable Match-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
Owning to the ever-growing spectrum demand by the
recent wireless technologies as well as the inefficiency of
traditional static spectrum assignment policy, spectrum scarcity
has become a critical challenge in wireless communication
networks [1]. Studies show that the traditional static spectrum
assignment policy is highly inefficient observing the fact that
the allocated bandwidths remain unused by the licensed users,
for a considerable amount of time. Indeed, the spectrum
utilization can vary in the range of 15% to 85% depending on
the geographical distribution and time [2]. Dynamic spectrum
sharing is seen as a promising approach toward alleviating
spectrum scarcity in wireless networks [3]. It allows the
unlicensed or secondary users (SUs) to dynamically access
the licensed bands of the legitimate primary users (PUs) in
exchange for functional or pecuniary compensation.
Generally, there are two scenarios of dynamic spectrum
sharing in literature based on the primary users’ awareness of
the secondary network’s presence, namely common model and
property-rights model [4]. In the common model, the primary
users are oblivious to the secondary network’s presence and
behave as if there is no secondary activities. The secondary
users sense the radio environment in search for spectrum
holes and then exploit it in an opportunistic manner. In the
property-rights model, it is assumed that the primary users are
aware of the secondary network’s presence and are willing to
lease a portion of their spectrum in exchange for monetary
or functional compensations [5], [6] and [7]. The functional
compensation scenario is called cooperative spectrum sharing,
which is the focus of this paper.
While the cooperative spectrum sharing carries consider-
able potential advantages in terms of spectral efficiency, its
deployment in wireless networks involves several new techni-
cal challenges including interference management, designing
incentive-based protocols to encourage the cooperation [8], [9],
selecting the optimal cooperative partner for the nodes, as well
as distributed self-organization among the others [10].
Recently, game theoretical approaches have been used to
study cooperative dynamic spectrum allocation from different
aspects. For example, in [11] the interactions between a PU
and a group of SUs is modeled within a Stackelberg game,
in which the SUs are granted to exploit the primary link in
exchange of monetary as well as functional compensation.
Authors in [12] propose a Stackelberg game to minimizing the
interference among the SUs which cooperate with a single PU.
However, most of the existing literature consider a simplified
scenario of interaction between a single PU and multiple SUs.
More importantly, despite of being of critical importance in
cooperative communications, the partner-selection problem has
been seldom investigated in the literature.
In this paper, inspired by matching theory, which is a
suitable approach to model the interactions among numerous
agents with conflicting interests [13], we propose a matching
game framework, in which multiple PUs and multiple SUs
interact with one another to select their best possible partner
for cooperation in order to optimize their own benefits. The
secondary terminals are granted the use of a specific portion of
spectrum by the PUs in exchange for cooperative service. The
optimum time-frame allocation solution for the cooperative
phase and the leased fraction to the SUs is obtained using
a Stackelberg game, while the matching scenario provides
an optimal answer to the problem of cooperative partner
selection. Numerical results confirm that the proposed twofold
optimization approach yields considerable gains in terms of
transmission rate for both PUs and SUs.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. i)
we optimize the time sharing model for multiple PUs and
multiple SUs using a Stackelberg game; ii) we propose a novel
matching game that captures the preferences of both primary
and secondary users to select their optimum partner in a
general network consisting of multiple PUs and multiple SUs;
iii) we propose a distributed algorithm to solve the matching
game that yields a stable matching between the sets of primary
and secondary users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section
II, the system model for the proposed scenario is presented.
In section III, the problem of spectrum sharing is modeled
in the framework of matching theory and a novel algorithm
for spectrum sharing is proposed. The simulation results are
provided in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cognitive radio network with N primary and
M secondary users. Let N = {PTi, PRi}Ni=1 and M =
{STi, SRi}
M
i=1 show the set of N primary transmitter-receiver
pairs and the set of M secondary transmitter-receiver pairs,
respectively. The primary users (PUs) are the spectrum’s
owners and have the right of interference-free communications
in their allocated frequency bands. The secondary users (SUs),
on the other hand, seek to obtain the transmission opportunities
through negotiation with the PUs. Each primary transmitter can
employ one secondary transmitter as a cooperative relay and
in turn provide it with the chance of spectrum access. This
coordination will improve the quality of service (QoS) for the
PUs by exploiting spatial diversity particularly in the cases of
poor channel conditions in the primary user’s links.
As shown in Figure 1, each time slot is divided into three
subslots according to two variables α and β. Each PTi broad-
casts its data in the first subslot of duration 1−α unit time, and
in the second subslot of duration αβ the selected SU j forwards
the message to the corresponding PRi. The third subslot of
duration α(1 − β) unit time is allocated to the secondary
transmitter-receiver pair (STj, SRj) for communicating their
own data. It is also assumed that all primary transmitters have
the same transmission power, PP . However, the secondary
users are able to adjust their transmission power PS in the
range of [0, Pmax] according to their target utility. We note
that the secondary users are constrained to use the same power
during the cooperation phase and transmitting their own traffic
(phases II and III in Figure 1). This regulation is enforced to
assure that the secondary transmitters are trustable in the sense
that they treat the primary’s data the same as their own [12].
The wireless channels between the nodes are modeled as
independent and identically distributed (iid) Rayleigh random
variables. For tractability, it is assumed that the instantaneous
channel state information (CSI) is available at the primary side.
The secondary users are only aware of the channel conditions
within the secondary network. All communication channels
suffer from block fading which is constant during a time-slot,
but can vary over different slots. The notations for channel
gains between different nodes are denoted in table I.
A. Transmission Rate for the PUs and SUs
Each PU may decide to employ a secondary transmitter
as a relay if cooperation improves its transmission rate with
respect to the direct transmission. Let RCP and RNCP denote
the transmission rate of primary link in cooperative and non-
cooperative modes, respectively. RNCP is given by:
RNCPi (PPi) = log(1 +
|hPi |
2PPi
N0
), ∀i ∈ N (1)
Assuming decode-and-forward relaying, the transmission
rate of primary link in cooperative mode can be calculated
Fig. 1: System Model
TABLE I: Notations for Channel Gains
Notation Physical Meaning
hPi primary link’s channel gain between PTi and PRi
hSj secondary link’s channel gain between STj and SRj
hPiSj channel gain between PTi and STj
hSjPi channel gain between STj and PRi
N0 noise power
as follows. In the first subslot of duration 1 − αij , the PTi
transmits to STj with the rate r1, which is equal to log(1 +
|hPiSj |
2PPi
N0
). In the second subslot of duration αijβij , the PTi
is silent and the STj transmits to PRi with the rate r2, which
is equal to log(1+ |hSjPi |
2PSj
N0
). The overall transmission rate is
equal to the minimum data rate of these two phases because the
transmission rate is dominated by the worst channel. Therefore,
for any i ∈ N and j ∈ M, RCPi is given by:
RCPi(αij , βij , PSj ) = min {(1− αij)r1, αijβijr2}. (2)
Finally, the transmission rate of the secondary link j when
it cooperates with PU i can be directly calculated as the
following equation:
RSj (αij , βij , PSj ) = αij(1−βij) log
(
1 +
|hSj |
2PSj
N0
)
. (3)
We note that the cooperation happens if and only if RCP >
RNCP . However for each PU i cooperating with SU j, RCPi
depends on αij , βij , and PSj which may vary for any SU
j. In the next section we derive the optimum values of these
variables for all user pairs (i, j) ∈ N ×M which maximize
the transmission rates of both users. Having determined these
three essential variables, the PUs and the SUs can conclude
whether cooperation is beneficial for them. Given the possible
cooperating agents for each user, we analyze the problem of
partner-selection within a matching game framework.
B. Optimal values of α and β
In this section, we derive the optimal values of (αij , βij)
and PSj for all (i, j) ∈ N × M using a Stackelberg game
framework in which the PUs and SUs play the role of the lead-
ers and followers, respectively. Each PU i seeks to maximize
its cooperative rate defined in (2) by selecting optimum values
for αij and βij (the PU’s strategies) with the knowledge of the
effect of its decision on the SU j’s strategy (PSj ). We define
the utility of primary users as their achievable transmission
rate:
UPi(αij , βij , PSj ) = max(R
C
Pi
, RNCPi ). (4)
On the other hand, the SUs attempt at maximizing their
achievable rate (3) under a reasonable cost of energy. We define
the following utility function of SU j ∈ M as its achievable
transmission rate minus its cost of energy [12].
USj (αij , βij , PSj ) = RSj (αij , βij , PSj )− αijCPSj ; (5)
in which C is the cost per unit transmission energy. Given αij
and βij , the secondary user j has a unique best strategy P ∗Sj ,
which can be found as:
P ∗Sj = arg max
PSj∈[0,Pmax]
USj (αij , βij , PSj ) (6)
We note that αij appears in (5) as a multiplying coefficient
and therefore, it does not affect the strategy of secondary user
in (6). Consequently, P ∗Sj is just a function of βij and can be
shown by P ∗Sj (βij). As the leader of the game, PUs maximize
their rates defined in (2) by selecting the appropriate values
for αij and βij with the knowledge of their decisions on the
strategy of all potential secondary relays (PSj ). We note that
parameter βij is present only in the second term of (2) and
therefore, it can be optimized independently as:
β∗ij = arg max
0≤βij≤1
β log(1 +
|hSjPi |
2P ∗Sj (βij)
N0
) (7)
Given β∗ij , the optimum value α∗ij can be easily computed
noting that the cooperative primary rate in (2) is the minimum
of a decreasing function of αij , (1−αij)r1, and an increasing
function of it, αijβijr2 which is maximized when the two
functions are equal. Solving the equation which results from
this condition gives rise to:
α∗ij =
r1
r1 + β∗ijr2
(8)
Therefore, by substituting (8) into (2), the primary rate in
cooperative mode reads:
RC∗Pi (α
∗
ij , β
∗
ij , PSj ) =
β∗ijr1r2(PSj )
r1 + β∗ijr2(PSj )
(9)
III. SPECTRUM SHARING AS A MATCHING GAME
In the previous section, we derived the optimum values of
the time sharing model parameters, α∗ij and β∗ij , for all pairs
(i, j) ∈ M × N . In this section, we study the problem of
partner-selection in the cooperative scenario under consider-
ation. Indeed, given the optimum time-sharing model for all
possible PU-SU pairs in the network, we are going to find out
that when the cooperation is profitable for PUs and what the
optimum approach is to assign the SUs to the PUs so as to
optimize their utilities.
Originally stems from economics, matching theory [13] is
a suitable mathematical framework to analyze and optimize the
problem of partner-selection among two groups of players with
conflicting interest. Merits of the stable matching framework
lie in the competitiveness of outcomes, generality of the
preferences, efficiency and simplicity of its algorithmic imple-
mentations, and most importantly, its overall practicality [14].
In particular, its advantage over other analytical and numerical
optimization methods becomes more evident when the number
of decision parameters or the number of players increases
beyond a limit where the optimization approaches prove to be
unfeasible due to tremendous computational complexity [15].
In this section, we formulate the cooperative spectrum
sharing problem as a one-to-one matching game between the
set of PUs and the set of SUs to solve the partner-selection
problem in the proposed scenario. We analyze the existence of
a stable matching and also study its optimality. Let’s consider
two disjoint sets of N and M, the primary and secondary
users, respectively. Each user has a complete and transitive
preference over the users on the other side. We use ≻i to
denote the ordering relationship of agent i. For example,
j ≻i j′ means that i prefer j over j′.
Definition 1: A matching µ is a function from M×N to
itself such that ∀n ∈ N and ∀m ∈ M: I. µ(n) = m if and
only if µ(m) = n; and II. µ(n) ∈M∪ ∅ and µ(m) ∈ N ∪ ∅.
This implies that the outcome matches the agents on one
side to those on the other side, or to the empty set. The
agents preferences over outcomes are determined solely by
their preferences for their own partners in the matching. To
solve a matching game, one suitable concept is that of a stable
matching.
Definition 2: A matching µ is blocked by the PU-SU pair
(i,j) if µ(i) 6= j and if i ≻j µ(j) and j ≻i µ(i). A one-to-one
matching is stable if it is not blocked by any PU-SU pair.
We capture the preferences of the primary and secondary
users by introducing well-defined utility functions. Based on
these utility functions, we analyze the existence of stable
matching between the primary and secondary users as the de-
sired outcome of the spectrum sharing problem. The secondary
users aim at maximizing their own transmission rates under
a reasonable cost of energy consumption according to their
utility defined in (5). On the other hand, the motivation of the
PUs to participate in cooperation is to improve their quality
of experience (QoE) using spatial diversity. Therefore, for the
PUs, we assume that the utility is the transmission rate which
is achieved by cooperation, i.e. RCP defined in (2). Given the
utility functions of the SUs and PUs, in the next section we
propose an efficient algorithm for solving the game that can
find a stable matching between primary and secondary users.
A. Proposed Algorithm
To solve the formulated game, we propose a novel dis-
tributed algorithm shown in Table II. Suppose that all the
SUs are initially not associated to any PU. The SUs send
their profile information including their CSI and Pmax to the
available PUs. Each PU i, on the other side, feeds back the SUs
by the ordered pair (α∗ij , β∗ij). Furthermore, each SU selects
its strategy (transmit power) according to the time allocation
parameters for all the PUs. Given the strategies of the PUs,
each SU sends a request of cooperation to its most preferred
PU. Among the SU applicants, the PU only keeps the list of
TABLE II: Proposed Algorithm For The Matching Game
Input: Utilities and the preferences of each set M and N
Output: Stable matching between the primary and secondary users
Initializing: All the SUs are matched with the null set ∅
Stage I: Preference Lists Composition
• PUs and SUs exchange their profile information
◦ Each PU i computes α∗ij and β
∗
ij according to its requirements
◦ Each SU j selects its transmission power PSj corresponding
to α∗ij and β
∗
ij for each i ∈ N
• Each PU i sorts the set of acceptable candidate SUs with DFi(j) = 1
• SUs sort the PUs based on their preference functions (5)
Stage II: Matching Evaluation
while: µ(n+1) 6= µ(n)
• Each SU j applies to its most preferred PU
• Each PU i accepts the most preferred applicant and rejects the rest
Repeat
• Each rejected SU applies to its next preferred PU
• Each PU updates its partner considering the new applicants and the
pervious partner
Until: Each SU are either assigned to one of the PUs or rejected by all of the
PUs
end
SUs who are capable of offering a transmission rate higher
than that of the direct path. Formally, for any i ∈ N and
j ∈M, we define the following discriminator function:
DFi(j) =
{
1, if RCPi(α
∗
ij , β
∗
ij , PSj ) > R
NC
Pi
0, Otherwise (10)
Each PU i computes DFi(j) for all the secondary candidates
and only accepts those ones which yield DFi(j) = 1. The rest
of the SUs will be rejected by PU i. Then, each PU ranks all
the acceptable SU applicants based on its utility defined in
(2). Upon ranking the acceptable SUs, the PU feeds back the
awaiting SUs with its decision about the admitted cooperator.
The SUs who have been rejected in the former phase will
apply to their next favorite PU and the PUs compare the
new applicants with their current temporary partner (if any)
and again select the most preferred one among them. This
procedure continues until all the SUs assigned to one of the
PUs or further proposals are impossible.
Here, we note that the outcome of one-to-one matching
markets is optimum for the set of players who make the
proposals [13] which in our model, is the set of SUs. The
proposed algorithm yields an stable matching between the
two sets of M and N for any initial preference functions
and the resultant matching is optimal from the SUs’ point
of view. The deferred acceptance method which is used in
stage II of the algorithm converges for any initial conditions.
The mathematical proof of stability amounts and we refer the
reader to [13] and [16]. However, the stability of the outcome
matching is intuitive since by introducing the null set ∅ as a
possible partner, each user has the option to stay unmatched
rather than being matched to partner which does not satisfy its
utility. Therefore, no blocking pair will emerge in the iterative
deferred acceptance algorithm in stage II because each SU only
propose to those PUs who satisfy its utility. As a result, the
matching includes no blocking pairs and therefore, it is stable.
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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we consider a network consisting of
N primary users and M secondary users. The wireless fading
channels are i.i.d. and have Rayleigh distribution with the scale
parameter σ = 0.5.
Figure 2 shows the average achievable rate per primary
user as a function of the number of SUs for two network
size of N = 30 and N = 20 PUs. As the number of
the SUs increases, more PUs get the chance to access a
cooperating relay and the average achievable rate will increase;
specially when the primary network’s size is smaller. We
note that RNCP is independent of the secondary network and
therefore, it is constant. Figure 2 shows that the proposed
cooperative matching approach yields considerable gain over
non-cooperative scenario.
Figure 3 shows the average utility per secondary user as a
function of the number of SUs for two network size of N = 30
and N = 20 PUs. It shows that as the number of SUs increases,
the average utility per SU will also increase because more SUs
get the chance to access a primary link for communication.
However, as the number of SUs increases, finding a primary
link becomes more competitive and beyond some point, the
average utility of SUs starts to decrease. Figure 3 shows that
for a network size of N = 20 PUs, the average utility for SUs
starts to decrease after introducing more than M = 20 SUs
in the network. Indeed, increasing the number of SUs beyond
M = 20 will inevitably result in having some unmatched SUs
in the network with utility 0 which consequently, decreases
the average utility per SU. We can conclude that increasing
the number of SUs beyond the network size N makes the
average utility per SU to approach zero gradually.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel cooperative spec-
trum sharing approach for a wireless network consisting of
multiple primary and secondary users. By introducing well-
designed utility functions, we modeled the problem of partner-
selection as a one-to-one matching game which optimizes the
utility of secondary network. To solve the presented matching
game, we have proposed a distributed algorithm that converges
to a stable matching between the set of primary users and
the set of secondary users. Simulation results show that the
proposed cooperative approach yields considerable gains in
terms of transmission rate compared to that of the non-
cooperative scenario for the primary users.
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